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GIVENS V. MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC AND THE
UNRESOLVED CIRCUIT SPLIT
Karen E. Alday†
Abstract
The natural gas industry is central to the United States economy.
However, due to vague regulations and judicial leniency, natural gas
pipeline companies have almost zero restraint in exercising eminent
domain. Their current operations mirror that of the federal
government’s authority to exercise immediate possession. Recently,
landowners have contested the pipeline industry’s authority to
exercise eminent domain, which has developed into a circuit split. The
Fourth Circuit, and the six other circuits that have followed suit, hold
that pipeline companies have the substantive right to immediate entry
and are entitled to a preliminary injunction before a trial on just
compensation. The Seventh Circuit holds that the courts do not have
the authority to grant immediate entry, and the pipeline company must
complete the entire standard condemnation process before entering
the property. In 2019, there were two attempts to bring this issue
before the Supreme Court, and both attempts failed. This Note
evaluates the most recent attempt in Givens v. Mountain Valley
Pipeline, LLC and argues that the Supreme Court should address this
issue and adopt the Seventh Circuit approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most couples spend decades planning and saving for
retirement. They will plan almost their entire lives around their
retirement goals and spend their life savings on making that dream a
reality.1 For one couple, that meant purchasing a farm in rural
Virginia.2 For over a decade, they used this farm as a source of income
as they approached retirement by growing crops, raising cattle, and
renting out the home on the property.3 However, what they initially
believed to be a safe investment started slipping through their hands
in 2014.4 Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC began building a 303-mile
pipeline with plans to run the pipeline directly through the couple’s
1. Ultimate
guide
to
retirement,
CNN
MONEY
https://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/basics_basics.moneymag/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/EM9T-K9L7].
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC,
140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (Mem.) (No. 19-54).
3. Id.
4. Pamela King, Va. widow leads eminent domain fight at Supreme Court, E&E
NEWS
(Aug.
13,
2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060934045
[https://perma.cc/QAG6-BABE].
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land.5 Their retirement dreams began to fracture when Mountain
Valley initiated eminent domain proceedings against them.6 The
couple, Karolyn and the late Clarence Givens, fought back and
attempted to take their battle to the Supreme Court.7 In October 2019,
that fight came to an end when the Court denied their petition for writ
of certiorari.8 While this did not come as a shock—the Supreme Court
denied a similar writ of certiorari in 2019—what the Givens might not
have known in the beginning is that the system is inherently against
them.9
Amid strife between global political leaders and the threat of
other countries’ burgeoning oil and gas industries, the United States
grasps on to its energy independence and remains an integral force in
the global oil and gas industry.10 However, the fear of having to rely
solely on U.S. adversaries like Saudi Arabia and Russia for energy
creates a heightened sense of urgency in securing the U.S. oil and gas
market.11 The incessant demand for oil and gas has prompted a surge
of natural gas pipeline development, and with the ever-present fear of
becoming energy dependent, legislators have heavily favored placing
oil and gas companies in the best and easiest position possible to do
business.12 As a result, the industry is booming with pipeline projects
such as one in the Appalachian Basin where $32.6 billion in
investments will generate 3,500 miles of “new, repurposed or replaced
pipelines across Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.”13

54).

5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (No. 19-

6. Id. at 8.
7. King, supra note 4.
8. Charles Fishburne, Supreme Court Denies Appeal of Eminent Domain for
Mountain
Valley
Pipeline, VPM NPR PBS (Oct.
8,
2019),
https://vpm.org/news/articles/7532/supreme-court-denies-appeal-of-eminentdomain-for-mountain-valley-pipeline [https://perma.cc/3HV4-A5VJ].
9. John Kramer, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Cert in Case Dealing with
Pipeline Company’s Abuses of Eminent Domain, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (May 28,
2019), https://ij.org/press-release/u-s-supreme-court-denies-cert-in-case-dealingwith-pipeline-companys-abuses-of-eminent-domain/
[https://perma.cc/EB8G7VSX].
10. Jude Clemente, Three Things to Know About the U.S. Oil and Natural Gas
Industry,
FORBES
(May
15,
2019,
9:23
A.M.)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/05/15/3-things-to-know-aboutthe-u-s-oil-and-natural-gas-industry/#2a01a9cafa67 [https://perma.cc/58JE-54DE].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Nicole Jacobs & Dan Alfaro, Infographic: More Than $32 Billion Being
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However, these pipeline projects, like all things, come at a
cost.14 The burden of the robust natural gas pipeline industry is carried
on the backs of private landowners, like the Givens, who would have
never once imagined their land would be taken by the U.S.
government, much less a natural gas pipeline company.15 Private
landowners have been deprived of their property without receiving
just compensation before the taking and have sometimes gone years
without seeing a penny from the natural gas companies.16
The Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) outlines the process in which
natural gas companies can seize private land for public use through
standard condemnation proceedings.17 However, the majority of
district courts grant preliminary injunctions to natural gas companies,
allowing them to enter and use the land before a trial on just
compensation.18 This begs the question of whether the courts are going
beyond the powers delegated to them in the NGA.19
In an effort to rein in the courts, there have been two attempts
to have the Supreme Court take up this issue in 2019 alone.20 This
Note will evaluate the most recent attempt in the Fourth Circuit case
of Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline. Specifically, this Note will
focus on two questions: (1) whether there is a circuit split that would
warrant Supreme Court intervention and (2) whether it is in the power
of the courts to issue a preliminary injunction before a trial on just
compensation. The Note agrees with the petitioners in Givens arguing
that there is a circuit split that should be evaluated by the Supreme
Invested in Appalachian Basin Pipelines, ENERGY IN DEPTH (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.energyindepth.org/infographic-more-than-32-billion-being-investedappalachian-basin-pipelines/ [https://perma.cc/2MTB-79DB].
14. John Kramer, New Findings: Pipeline Companies Flout Law Nationwide,
Take Land Without First Paying Property Owners, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 8,
2019),
https://ij.org/press-release/new-findings-pipeline-companies-flout-lawnationwide-take-land-without-first-paying-property-owners/
[https://perma.cc/E3X8-KQF9].
15. Id.
16. RJ Vogt, Land Grab: Property Owners Fight Back Against Pipeline IOUs,
LAW 360 (April 28, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1153244
[https://perma.cc/KK4B-MLWQ].
17. Id.
18. Jeremy P. Hopkins & Elizabeth M. Hopkins, Separation of Powers: A
Forgotten Protection in the Context of Eminent Domain and the Natural Gas Act,
16 REGENT U.L. REV. 371, 373 (2004).
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline,
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (No. 19-54).
20. Vogt, supra note 16.
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Court, and the courts are beyond the bounds of the NGA in issuing
preliminary injunctions before a trial on just compensation. This Note
evaluates whether the courts are following the provisions of the NGA,
not whether the courts are going beyond the bounds of the
Constitution.21
Section II will provide the statutory and case law backdrop to
Givens. It will provide an overview of the natural gas pipeline’s
authority to exercise eminent domain under the NGA and a summary
of the process pipeline companies go through to obtain the ability to
condemn private property under the NGA. This section will also
explain the development of case law on this issue, along with a more
in-depth understanding of how the circuit split developed. Section III
will define the circuit split and describe in detail the primary cases that
outline the split.
Section IV will elaborate on the Supreme Court developments
on this issue. It will describe the recent attempts to bring this issue to
the Supreme Court. This section will argue that the Court needs to
adopt the approach of the Seventh Circuit. Lastly, this section will
explore the pipeline company’s rights at the time a court grants a
preliminary injunction and how the courts have exceeded their
discretion in granting these preliminary injunctions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Natural Gas Act and Eminent Domain
The NGA enables certain private entities in the energy
industry, like natural gas pipeline companies, to exercise eminent
domain.22 The authority to exercise eminent domain rests with the
legislature; however, Congress can delegate this authority to private
entities.23 When Congress delegates this power, it must do so
expressly, and the power granted must not be greater “than those
expressed or necessarily implied.”24 In other words, private entities
21. For further reading on the constitutionality of the Court’s actions under the
NGA please refer to Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18 at 371.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006).
23. Jim Behnke & Harold Dondis, The Sage Approach to Immediate Entry by
Private Entities Exercising Federal Eminent Domain Authority Under the Natural
Gas Act and the Federal Power Act, 27 ENERGY L.J. 499, 502 (2006).
24. Id.
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with delegated eminent domain power are limited to exercise eminent
domain within the scope that Congress has expressly specified in the
enabling statute.25 Standard eminent domain and quick-take are the
two main types of eminent domain procedures.26 The NGA authorizes
pipeline companies to use standard eminent domain procedures.27
The NGA authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) to regulate the natural gas industry.28 The
FERC regulates natural gas projects, the interstate transmission of
natural gas, and other energy issues related to electricity and gas.29 The
Commission sets out the procedure for regulatory approval, including
obtaining right of ways from private landowners.30 Therefore, the
FERC is responsible for providing an appropriate process for pipeline
companies to obtain eminent domain authority.31 It does so by
overseeing and implementing the application process to obtain a
certification of “public convenience of necessity.”32 The NGA
requires public convenience and necessity certification of all pipeline
companies engaging in the transportation or sale of natural gas.33 This
certification’s purpose is to create a threshold level of necessity that
pipeline companies must meet to exercise eminent domain.34
However, once a certificate is issued, it does not automatically give
the pipeline company the authority to enter the property immediately,
such as in a quick-take proceeding.35 Pipeline companies still have to
go through standard eminent procedures.36 While only two pipeline
projects have been denied their pipeline proposals over the past thirty
years, the process of obtaining the proper authority to exercise
standard eminent domain powers is elaborate, overwhelming, and

25. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 379–80.
26. Victoria Mazzola, Comment, Putting the Pieces of the Puzzle Together: The
Natural Gas Pipeline Approval Process is a Procedural Jigsaw, 64 VILL. L. REV.
459, 467 (2019).
27. Id.
28. § 717o.
29. About
FERC,
FED.
ENERGY
REG.
COMMISSION,
https://www.ferc.gov/about/what-ferc [https://perma.cc/6AHJ-2UX7].
30. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 464.
31. § 717o.
32. § 717(d).
33. § 717(c)(1)(a).
34. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 502.
35. Id.
36. § 717f(h).
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lengthy for pipeline companies, much less private landowners, to
navigate.37
When a company is interested in constructing a new interstate
pipeline, the first step is to apply for certification of public
convenience with the FERC.38 The application includes a description
of the pipeline, a statement of the facts explaining why the pipeline is
necessary, and an approximate start and end date of the construction
of the pipeline.39 Once the application is submitted, the FERC’s
experts, including professionals in the scientific, legal, and economic
fields, evaluate factors relating to the pipeline’s cultural and
environmental impacts.40 Then, the FERC submits the application for
public comment.41 When the project becomes open for public
comment, private property owners who might be affected by the
pipeline are notified by mail that their property may be subject to
eminent domain proceedings.42 Following public comment, the FERC
conducts public hearings on the proposed application.43 The FERC
then reviews the application as a whole and decides whether to accept
the application.44 During this process, the pipeline company can make
changes to the pipeline route, and the company is not required to have
secured all the necessary state and federal permits.45 If the FERC
approves the pipeline company’s application for certification, the
company and the citizens affected by the construction begin
negotiations regarding compensation price and easement
agreements.46
At this stage, when private landowners refuse to sell or
negotiate with pipeline companies, which occurs often, pipeline
companies can file condemnation actions against the private
landowners in a federal district court.47 The NGA delegates
jurisdiction to federal courts to decide eminent domain cases.48 In
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Mazzola, supra note 25, at 463–64.
Id. at 469.
§ 717f(d); 18 C.F.R. 153.7 (2020).
Mazzola, supra note 25, at 469.
Id.
Id.
§ 717f(d).
Mazzola, supra note 25, at 469.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 502.
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granting jurisdiction, the NGA outlines the procedures the court must
use to determine how immediate entry and other issues related to
eminent domain should be resolved.49 The federal courts have abided
by a three-prong elemental test outlined in the NGA.50 The elements
are as follows: (1) the party must have obtained a FERC certificate of
public convenience and necessity; (2) the party has attempted but
failed to acquire the substantive rights required to “construct, operate,
and maintain a FERC-approved pipeline” because the private property
owners and the pipeline company cannot reach an agreement; and (3)
the property value sought must be over $3,000.51
While the courts follow these procedures, the issue here is that
the courts might be undermining the authority the NGA has delegated
to them. One of the chief arguments of landowners involved in these
suits is that the courts are impliedly allowing quick-take procedures
while no legislative authority has expressly allowed the courts to do
so and, therefore, disregarding standard eminent domain procedures.52
In a standard eminent domain procedure, the party preparing to
condemn the property files a condemnation action in one proceeding,
and the court determines the amount of compensation at a separate
proceeding after the condemnation proceeding.53 At the compensation
proceeding, the party bringing the condemnation action decides to
either purchase the property at the determined price or dismiss the
action.54 The title does not pass until after the condemning party pays
just compensation to the appropriate property owner, and then the
condemning party can seize the property.55
In comparison, quick-take procedures are harsh and intrusive
because of the government’s swift action in obtaining the land.56 In a
quick-take proceeding, the condemning party files a “Declaration of
Taking” and deposits what it assumes the monetary value of the
property to be with the court.57 Once the condemning party completes

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Mazzola, supra note 25, at 467.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006).
E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 824 (4th Cir. 2004).
Mazzola, supra note 25, at 468.
Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 384.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 372.
Mazzola, supra note 25, at 468.
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this two-step process, the party may seize the property, and they have
obtained title to the land.58
Typically, as seen in most of the cases on this issue, after the
pipeline company has obtained the FERC certificate, the company
initiates eminent domain proceedings against resisting landowners.59
Routinely, the pipeline company moves for “summary judgment on its
substantive right to take the easements by eminent domain” and
requests a preliminary injunction for access and possession during the
proceedings.60 Landowners could argue that this current procedure
resembles quick-take procedures because when the court grants a
preliminary injunction before a trial on just compensation, it allows
the pipeline company to enjoy all the benefits of having title to the
property before a trial on just compensation.61 In other words, the
preliminary injunction grants the pipeline company immediate access,
bypassing the necessary procedures of a standard eminent domain
proceeding, and it postpones the just compensation phase until after
the party exercising condemnation has received possession of the
property.62 This procedure raises the question of whether the courts
are complying with the NGA because the NGA does not expressly
state that quick-take procedures or immediate possession are
permitted.63
B. The Development of Pipeline v. Property Owner Cases
The two main approaches to pipeline condemnation
proceedings have developed over the past few decades. The attitudes
of the courts towards eminent domain have evolved since the first time
a court denied immediate entry to a private company possessing
eminent domain authority in 1957.64 In Algonquin Gas Transmission
v. Herman Yules, a natural gas company held a certificate of public
58. Id.
59. James W. Adams, Craig D. Stocker, & Lynne M. Jurek, The Business of Gas
Pipeline Condemnation: A Multistate Analysis, 13 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 128, 142.
60. Mountain Valley Pipeline v. 6.56 Acres of Land, 915 F.3d 197, 210 (4th Cir.
2019).
61. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 380.
62. Id. at 405.
63. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 2.14 Acres, 907
F.3d 725, 736 (3d Cir. 2018).
64. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 542. This unpublished case is only
available in the files of The Sage Approach authors.
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convenience and necessity issued by the now-defunct Federal Power
Commission (the FERC has taken over the role of the Federal Power
Commission).65 The gas company argued that the court could exercise
its inherent equity discretion and grant the gas company immediate
entry before a trial on just compensation.66 The court ultimately denied
the petition for immediate entry.67 However, the court noted that there
may be circumstances where granting immediate entry would be
suitable.68 In denying the petition, the court found that the pipeline
company suffered minimal prejudice, and this result avoided harm to
the landowner.69
Pipeline eminent domain issues were not litigated again until
the early 1980s.70 At this time, courts took a turn that has endured
through the decades and is central to this Note. Courts began to
exercise their equity jurisdiction in deciding these cases.71 For
example, in 1981, a district court decided that it could exercise its
inherent powers to provide equitable relief; therefore, the court
granted the pipeline company the right to enter the land before a trial
on just compensation.72
In Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, the
pipeline company obtained a FERC certificate of public convenience
and sought “immediate possession of the right of way and easements”
of the land at issue.73 The pipeline company argued that it was entitled
to immediate possession through equitable relief.74 The court reasoned
that the pipeline company was entitled to equitable relief because it
satisfied both parts of the two-prong test for equitable relief.75 In the
first step, the plaintiff must demonstrate that either the “primary right
. . . must be equitable rather than legal or the remedy sought must be
equitable.”76 In the second step, the plaintiff must articulate that it is
65. Id. at 525–26.
66. Id. at 526.
67. Id. at 526–27.
68. Id. at 500.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 525.
71. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 170, 172
(D.N.D. 1981).
72. Id. at 173.
73. Id. at 171.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 173.
76. Id. at 172. (“If the legal remedy is inadequate, the court may exercise its
equitable jurisdiction.”).

2021]

GIVENS V. MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC

147

“subject to imminent, irreparable injury in the absence of a grant of
equitable relief.”77 The court found that the pipeline company
demonstrated that the legal remedy, a standard condemnation
proceeding, was “inadequate under the circumstances.”78 The pipeline
company explained that it would not be able to meet its construction
deadlines and budget if it had to go through the standard condemnation
proceeding.79 Construction personnel was ready to initiate
construction in the disputed area, which made immediate possession
necessary.80 The court recognized these reasons as sufficient and
granted equitable relief on the condition that the pipeline company
deposited the estimated cost of just compensation with the court’s
registry.81
In light of this case, it is important to note that the court here
recognized that the pipeline company did not have the authority under
the NGA to exercise immediate possession “prior to a condemnation
proceeding.”82 That power only rests with the federal government, and
“no statutory authority exists” that would enable the plaintiffs to
exercise this power.83 However, the court still decided that the pipeline
company was able to obtain immediate possession through equitable
relief, which set the standard of these cases for years to come.84
The division between pipeline eminent domain approaches hit
a milestone in 1998. The Seventh Circuit denied immediate entry to a
pipeline company in Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of
Land.85 In this case, the court reasoned that it could not exercise
equitable relief in favor of the pipeline company.86 In 2004, the Fourth
Circuit took an opposing view in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v.
Sage.87 The court held that it could provide injunctive relief and
77. Id.
78. Id. at 172–73.
79. Id. at 172.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 173.
82. Id. at 172.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 173.
85. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th
Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s holding that “Northern Border ‘has no legal
right to immediate possession under either federal substantive law or Illinois
substantive law’”).
86. Id. at 471.
87. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding
that “the court may exercise equitable power to grant the remedy of immediate
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granted the pipeline company the right of immediate entry.88 Since the
Sage decision, the majority of circuit courts have followed the Sage
approach.89 Only the Seventh Circuit has stood by the rule articulated
in Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land.90
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The chief issue in these cases is simple but creates a cloud of
confusion regarding how the federal courts should handle this issue.
After a pipeline company obtains a FERC certificate, the majority of
U.S. district courts have granted a preliminary injunction in favor of
the pipeline companies to take the land before a trial on just
compensation.91 However, the NGA does not expressly allow for
immediate possession before a trial on just compensation, and it could
be argued that the NGA impliedly denies the court the ability to grant
a preliminary injunction.92 The conflict that has arisen between the
circuit courts centers around the question of whether the court can
issue a preliminary injunction without the express authority from the
NGA—it is a statutory construction issue, not a question of
constitutionality.93
A. The Fourth Circuit Sage Approach
Sage outlines the approach that favors granting a preliminary
injunction and allowing pipeline companies to operate on the land
before a trial on just compensation.94 In Sage, the East Tennessee
Natural Gas Company was constructing a pipeline “over 1,300 tracts
of land in Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina.”95 After
negotiating with hundreds of landowners and initiating 133
landowners were still fighting condemnation.96 In these proceedings,
the company filed motions for immediate possession of the easements
possession through the issuance of a preliminary injunction”).
88. Id. at 828.
89. Vogt, supra note 16.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 373.
93. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land, 915 F.3d 197, 213
(4th Cir. 2019).
94. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 544.
95. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 819 (4th Cir. 2004).
96. Id. at 819–20.

2021]

GIVENS V. MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC

149

and argued that the court could exercise equitable relief.97 The district
court held that it could use its inherent powers to grant a preliminary
injunction, an equitable remedy.98 The court relied on the fact that
stalling the construction of the pipeline would lead to an “extended
delay.”99 The landowners filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit,
arguing that the NGA does not grant the pipeline companies the ability
to obtain immediate possession because the statute does not include
the ability to use quick-take proceedings.100 Additionally, the court
must construe eminent domain statutes strictly and, therefore, could
not invoke equity principles.101
Sage severed the FERC certification right to take the land from
the trial of just compensation.102 In doing so, it only reviewed the
FERC certification for the pipeline’s right to condemn.103 Here, the
court held that the use of a preliminary injunction was appropriate
where the district court had determined that the FERC certificate
established the pipeline company’s right to exercise eminent
domain.104 The court noted that a preliminary injunction provides
sufficient procedural safeguards for landowners that are even more
protective than a quick-take proceeding.105
Regarding the landowner’s second argument, the court
reasoned that a strictly construed statute does not bar the court from
exercising the principles of equity.106 The court pointed out that the
landowners overlooked the overwhelming public interest the pipeline
serves.107 The Sage court rendered a preliminary injunction with
equity because it determined that the pipeline company met the
requirements for a mandatory preliminary injunction, and it is likely
that the pipeline would be granted the condemnation right in the future
because of the FERC certification.108

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 820.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820, 822, 824.
Id. at 826.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
Sage, 361 F.3d at 820.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 825–26.
Id. at 826.
Id.
Id. at 818, 830, 828.
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In sum, the Sage approach requires that: (1) the pipeline
company demonstrates it has the right to take under the FERC; (2) the
conditions for preliminary injunctive relief are satisfied and
mandatory; and (3) the landowner’s compensation is adequately
secured. 109 In evaluating whether to grant the preliminary injunction,
the court looks to four factors: “(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm
to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, (2) the likelihood of harm to
the defendant if the injunction is granted, (3) the likelihood the
plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (4) the public interest.”110
Preliminary injunctions are almost always granted because the
interstate pipelines serve an overwhelming public need to supply
energy and hold on to U.S. energy independence.111 Additionally,
courts have reasoned that the pipeline companies will face irreparable
harm if they are required to wait for a trial on just compensation.112
B. The Seventh Circuit Northern Border Pipeline Approach
The Seventh Circuit remains the outlier on this question.113 In
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, the Seventh
Circuit held that the court had no authority to issue a preliminary
injunction because the Northern Border Pipeline Company had no
preexisting entitlement to the land.114 In this case, the pipeline
company obtained a FERC certificate, because the company was “not
content with the pace of ordinary eminent domain proceeding[s],” so
it moved for immediate possession of the property.115 The pipeline
company argued that the court should grant a mandatory preliminary
injunction.116 The district court denied the pipeline company’s request,
and the pipeline company appealed.117 On appeal, the circuit court
affirmed the district court’s decision.118 The court reasoned that a
109. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 502.
110. Sage, 361 F.3d at 828.
111. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Conestoga Twp., 907 F.3d 725, 733 (3d
Cir. 2018) (finding that the project was in the public interest “further tipped this
factor in favor of Transcontinental”); id. at 830; N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79
Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.N.D. 1981).
112. Vogt, supra note 16.
113. Id.
114. 144 F.3d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1998).
115. Id. at 470.
116. Id. at 471.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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preliminary injunction was only available “when the moving party has
a substantive entitlement to the relief sought.”119 While the company
argued that it has a substantive right to the property through its
eminent domain power under the NGA, the court hinged its decision
on the fact that the company’s rights were not “fully vested before the
initiation of the lawsuit.”120 In other words, without a preexisting right
to the land, the court would not issue a preliminary injunction.121 The
Seventh Circuit’s approach does not recognize a pipeline company’s
substantive right until it has been granted and will not grant the right
to condemn based on what might happen in the future.122 While the
Fourth Circuit interprets the FERC as granting a substantive right, the
Seventh Circuit recognizes that this right is granted after the
proceeding on just compensation.123
C. The Supreme Court Should Provide Clarity
There has been pushback from pipeline companies on this
split. In Mountain Valley’s brief in opposition to the petition for writ
of certiorari, it argued that there is no circuit split. The company
argued that the Seventh Circuit approach evaluates a completely
different area of the law and that the Seventh Circuit agrees with the
Sage approach.124 Mountain Valley argued that the Seventh Circuit did
not even reach this issue because the pipeline company asserted it had
a substantive right based solely on its FERC certificate of public
convenience and did not initiate standard eminent domain proceedings
at the district court level.125 According to Mountain Valley, and the
other cases on this issue, the pipeline company based its substantive
right on its FERC certificate of public convenience and the standard
condemnation proceedings at the district court level after obtaining the
certification.126 Mountain Valley argued that taking these two steps
together gives pipeline companies the authority to exercise eminent
119. Id.
120. Id. at 471–72 (“Northern Border’s right to the land do[es] not vary when the
FERC issues it a certificate”).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 471.
123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
124. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Givens, 140
S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 14.
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domain.127 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit did not grant the injunction
because the pipeline company did not obtain orders determining its
substantive right to the property before filing a motion for immediate
possession.128 Mountain Valley reasoned that this would have been the
same outcome in every other circuit court because each circuit agrees
that there must be a “finding of authority to condemn by the district
court before an immediate-possession injunction can be awarded.”129
The Seventh Circuit applies a different meaning to the FERC
certification.130 Karolyn Givens argued in her petition for certiorari
that there is a circuit split because the FERC certification does not give
companies a preexisting entitlement to possession, which is the view
other circuit courts apply.131 The FERC certification allows pipeline
companies to participate in the process of obtaining the substantive
right, but the only way to obtain the right is to complete the entire
process, including a trial on just compensation.132 Courts cannot
assume that they will complete the process—they must complete it.133
The other circuits are satisfied with companies entering the process
and view this as enough to obtain the rights.134 In other words, entering
the process is enough to rely on for a preliminary injunction. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that granting a preliminary injunction would
only be appropriate where the “substantive entitlement to the relief
sought . . . was fully vested even before the initiation of the lawsuit.”135
This approach on the use of preliminary injunctions is fundamentally
different than the approach other circuit courts take, which is that the
FERC certificate essentially gives the pipline companies the
substantive right.136 The Seventh Circuit recognizes that the FERC
does not give the pipeline company any “substantive entitlement to the
land right now;” therefore, the pipeline company cannot point to any
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 15.
130. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
131. See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Conestoga Twp., 907 F.3d 725, 733–36
(3d Cir. 2018).
132. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 148–49, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54)
(emphasis added) (quoting N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d
469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 1998)).
136. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
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authority that gives it a substantive right, and the court cannot use a
preliminary injunction to grant them immediate possession. 137
In sum, a circuit split exists because the Seventh Circuit in
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land placed a
different meaning on the FERC certification process, and the pipeline
companies are entitled to compare the legal authority to the Fourth
Circuit and the other circuit courts that have followed the Sage
approach. The Seventh Circuit holds that the FERC certification does
not grant pipeline companies a substantive right, but the certification
lets them enter the process towards obtaining a substantive right.138
The Fourth Circuit holds that the FERC certification essentially grants
pipeline companies a substantive right at the time the certification is
issued, and the use of a preliminary injunction hastens the enforcement
of the substantive right.139
IV. SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS
As the circuit split illustrates, there is confusion among
landowners about the status and security of their property. With their
livelihood threatened, some landowners have fought condemnation
with the hopes that the Supreme Court will change the course of the
circuit and district courts.140 However, the Court denied two
opportunities to resolve this dispute in 2019.141
A. Recent Supreme Court Attempts
The recent increase in pipeline development projects across the
northeast has led to a surge of pipeline eminent domain litigation.142
For example, a major player in the natural gas pipeline industry,
Transcontinental, was involved in five cases in federal circuit courts
in 2018, compared to only six from 1989 to 2017.143 The recent
pipeline construction proposals have led to disruption in rural
communities, and some homeowners have decided to fight back. In
137. Id.; see N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471–
72 (7th Cir. 1998).
138. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
139. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
140. Vogt, supra note 16.
141. Kramer, supra note 9; Fishburne, supra note 8.
142. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 462.
143. Id. at 462–63.
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2019 alone, there have been two attempts to bring this to the Supreme
Court’s attention.144
The first attempt came out of the Third Circuit, where the
circuit court upheld the grant of a preliminary injunction and
specifically looked at whether the district court effectively granted a
quick-take rather than proceeding under standard eminent domain
guidelines.145 The circuit court reasoned that this was not a quick-take
because the pipeline company followed the proper procedures outlined
for standard eminent domain at the district court level.146 Here, the
landowners argued that “the use of a preliminary injunction amounted
to a quick-take,” and the NGA does not afford pipeline companies the
authority to use quick-take procedures to obtain title to a property;
therefore, the courts are usurping the power of the legislature by
utilizing preliminary injunctions in this way.147 In response, the court
reasoned that quick-take procedures and the use of preliminary
injunctions have “meaningful distinctions in law.”148 Specifically,
because the pipeline company had obtained a FERC public
convenience certification, it already obtained the substantive right to
enter the property.149 The use of a preliminary injunction “hastened
the enforcement of the substantive right—it did not create new
rights.”150
Regardless of whether the use of a preliminary injunction
amounts to quick-take, the landowners also argued that the NGA does
not provide for immediate possession, which preliminary injunction
necessarily produces.151 The court’s response to this was that the NGA
does not specify that the “rules governing preliminary injunctions
should be suspended in condemnation proceedings.”152 In other words,
the NGA does not get rid of this equitable remedy, and courts are
within their authority to exercise this power, regardless of whether it
amounts to immediate possession.153 In sum, the district court did not
144.
145.
2018).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Vogt, supra note 16.
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Conestoga Twp., 907 F.3d 725, 729 (3d Cir.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 729, 735.
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 738.
Id.
Id.
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usurp legislative authority in granting the preliminary injunction, and
the NGA does not rule out the use of preliminary injunctions.154
The second attempt, which is the primary focus of this Note, is
from the Fourth Circuit in Mountain Valley Pipeline v. 6.56 Acres of
Land. The central question in the case was whether the pipeline
company could gain access to the easements at moment it received
FERC certification or if it had to wait until a trial on just compensation
to start construction.155 The district court held that the pipeline
company did not have to wait until the court determined just
compensation and affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the
company a preliminary injunction to access the easements and begin
construction.156
Courts use a four-pronged test when determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction, and here, the court found that Mountain
Valley satisfied all four elements.157 The first element is the likelihood
of success on the merits, which Mountain Valley easily satisfied
because it had the right to condemn the landowner’s property, and
Mountain Valley obtained the substantive right to the property through
a partial summary judgment at the district court level.158 The second
element is whether the party would suffer irreparable injury, and the
court reasoned that Mountain Valley would suffer irreparable injury
because the extremely long delay in construction would likely hinder
Mountain Valley from meeting its October 2020 deadline mandated
by the FERC.159 The court believed this element was important
because if Mountain Valley had to wait until the determination of just
compensation for the hundreds of landowners involved in this case, it
would be well past the October 2020 deadline set out by the FERC and
would cost Mountain Valley millions of dollars to stall construction.160
The third element is a balance of equities, and here, the court found
the losses suffered by Mountain Valley far exceeded whatever harm
the landowners suffered as a result of the preliminary injunction.161
Additionally, the landowners identified harms that “would be inflicted
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 740.
915 F.3d at 209.
Id.
Id. at 216, 219, 221.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 220.
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as a result of the eminent domain itself,” not because of the
preliminary injunction.162 The last element focuses on public interest,
and in relying on the report issued by the FERC, the court determined
the project would serve a public need.163
The plaintiffs here argued that the appellate court should
overrule the Sage decision because the NGA does not allow for
immediate possession.164 The landowners asserted that by expressly
providing for standard condemnation proceedings, the NGA
forecloses the possibility that courts can grant possession “through the
equitable remedy of a preliminary injunction.”165 The circuit court did
not adopt this approach and held that Sage governed—allowing the
court to grant the pipeline company a preliminary injunction, an
equitable remedy.166
In July 2019, property owners in the Mountain Valley case
filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, arguing that preliminary
injunctions were an improper use of federal jurisdictional power.167
The Court denied certiorari in October 2019, bringing only more
confusion to the situation.168 While both attempts have failed, this
demonstration of efforts points toward an ever-growing interest in
clarifying a pipeline company’s authority in exercising eminent
domain and whether that authority complies with the NGA.
The future of pipeline eminent domain litigation hangs in the
balance after the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari for Givens
v. Mountain Valley Pipeline. While a denial of certiorari lets the
appellate decision stand, it does not indicate that the Court agrees with
the result of the case.169 Whether the Supreme Court agrees with the
way the lower courts are deciding these cases is up for debate, and it
is highly possible that these recent attempts will continue to grow in
number as more pipeline projects continue to expand across the United
States.

162. Id. at 212.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 214–15.
165. Id. at 214.
166. Id. at 215.
167. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
168. Givens v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, 140 S. Ct. 300 (2019) (Mem.).
169. Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227,
1303 (1979).
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B. The Supreme Court Should Adopt the Seventh Circuit Approach
The Sage approach may exceed the bounds outlined in the
NGA. Courts have continued to adopt this approach in the interest of
efficiency but ultimately to the detriment of private property owner’s
rights. In order to safeguard private property rights, courts should
follow the clear guidelines of the NGA, which do not give pipeline
companies the authority to obtain immediate possession of the
property. Additionally, to prevent altering the substantive rights of the
parties, courts should stop granting mandatory preliminary injunctions
in these pipeline-landowner cases. For these reasons, the Supreme
Court should take up this issue and adopt the Seventh Circuit
approach.
1. The NGA Does Not Authorize Immediate Possession
The NGA is an unambiguous statute—it expressly provides
that standard eminent domain proceedings are allowed, but it is silent
on whether the courts should allow immediate possession in the form
of a preliminary injunction, which closely imitates quick-take
proceedings.170 The statutory construction canon expressio unius
strongly favors the exclusion of this provision. Expressio unius is a
well-settled statutory construction tool, and it means that “expressing
one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left
unmentioned.”171 In utilizing this tool, the court must look at the
context of the statute, and this canon has more force when the party
can show that Congress excluded the provision by “deliberate choice,
not inadvertence.”172 The NGA provides for standard condemnation
proceedings but does not mention the more intrusive quick-take
proceedings that are reserved only for governmental use. The
landowners could argue here that the drafters of the NGA specifically
excluded exceptions to the standard eminent domain proceeding
because the NGA only mentions standard eminent domain
proceedings and is silent on quick-take proceedings or the use of any
other methods to grant immediate possession. The court could
170. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 467; see also Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §
717f(h) (2018).
171. N.L.R.B. v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002)).
172. Id. (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2013)
(citing Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232–33 (2011))).
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consider the exclusion of quick-take proceedings and other forms of
immediate possession as a deliberate choice because these methods
are often more intrusive and specifically reserved for the federal
government.173 Opponents will likely argue that leaving out a
provision for immediate possession is mere inadvertence. However,
looking at the context of the statute, one could argue that in a
proceeding where a third-party deprives a private citizen of his
property, the court should read the statute narrowly.
In Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, the
court reasoned that the condemnation proceeding under the given
circumstances was inadequate.174 However, while the court found this
proceeding inadequate, this is exactly what Congress intended.
Congress alone has the power to delegate eminent domain authority,
and with that power, Congress is the only branch of government that
can define eminent domain proceedings.175 Here, the court is taking
this power into its own hands by creating an expedited method for
condemnation. If Congress wanted to create an expedited method for
condemnation proceedings “where the condemner takes the property
before trial and pays the court-determined price later,” it could.176 That
is not the case here, and the court should rely on the default rule and
not give early access to the pipeline companies.177
Most importantly, and the essential difference between the two
approaches, is that the court is granting a substantive right before it
exists. Once just compensation is paid, the pipeline companies have the
substantive right to exercise eminent domain.178 Up until that point,
they do not have a vested right in the private landowner’s property.179
The NGA expressly gives the power of the Takings Clause to pipeline
companies once they have obtained the necessary certifications.180 The
NGA specifies the process in which this occurs, and here, the statute
173. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 372–73.
174. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 170, 172
(D.N.D. 1981).
175. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty.,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987); see Seacombe v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., 90 U.S. 108,
118 (1874).
176. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
177. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984).
178. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 476.
179. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 86.72 Acres of Land, 144 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.
1998).
180. Mazzola, supra note 25, at 475.
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provides for standard condemnation proceedings, meaning that the
right is conferred after just compensation has been provided.181 The
Supreme Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit approach because it
appropriately recognizes that the court cannot grant immediate
possession before the substantive right fully vests. This is the approach
that is squarely within the bounds of the NGA and most closely follows
congressional intent.
2. Courts Have Exceeded the Limits of Equity
Equity must still follow the law, and courts must not grant a
remedy that is beyond what a party is entitled to.182 However, in these
cases, the court accomplishes this by granting a preliminary
injunction. The court grants the pipeline company a substantive right
it is not entitled to at the time of the ruling.183
While the NGA gives jurisdiction to the district courts in
condemnation proceedings, district courts rely on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 65 and the judiciary’s inherent
equitable powers to grant preliminary injunctions.184 FRCP Rule 65(a)
provides an equitable, injunctive remedy in a NGA condemnation
proceeding.185 Pipeline companies have to “apply under Rule 65(a) for
a preliminary injunction awarding immediate possession.”186 The
inherent power of the court is defined as “those powers ‘necessary to
the exercise of all others.’”187 This doctrine is grounded in the
Constitution, and the courts have utilized this power since the
judiciary’s inception.188 However, the exercise of these powers is not
limitless.189 While there are efforts to regulate the use of this power, it
is by no means “uniform.”190

181. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2006).
182. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 3792.
183. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
184. Behnke & Dondis, supra note 23, at 502; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 15, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
185. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 824 (4th Cir. 2004).
186. Id.
187. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 820 (1987).
188. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 397–98.
189. Id. at 398.
190. Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and
Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217, 253 (1993).
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Equity must follow the law, and courts cannot impose
remedies that expand the party’s legal entitlements.191 Principally, the
Rules Enabling Act demands that when courts employ the federal
rules, they cannot “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right.”192 The federal courts cannot “displace a [s]tate’s definition of
its own rights and remedies.”193 However, that is what the courts are
doing here by stripping away still intact state-property rights before
title has passed. Here, the courts are expediting the right to the
property and modifying the right by placing it in the pipeline
company’s possession right now as compared to in the future. Courts
utilize preliminary injunctions to maintain the same position of the
parties while litigation proceeds.194 However, in pipeline-landowner
cases, the court irreversibly alters the position of the parties when
issuing a preliminary injunction. After a preliminary injunction, the
landowners must allow the pipeline company to begin construction.
Further, it is important to note that courts are issuing
mandatory preliminary injunctions.195 A mandatory preliminary
injunction requires affirmative action on the part of the nonmoving
party, the landowner.196 Courts typically disfavor mandatory
preliminary injunctions because they are an extraordinary remedy.197
A mandatory preliminary injunction requires a heightened burden for
the moving party, the pipeline company, in demonstrating the
necessary factors for a preliminary injunction.198 When courts grant
mandatory preliminary injunctions, they disrupt the status of
landowners because the landowners must allow the pipeline company
191. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 619–20 (2012);
see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1990).
193. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. All-State Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
418 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens concurred on the narrowest grounds,
and the majority of courts of appeals follow this concurrence. E.g., Whitlock v. FSL
Mgmt., LLC, 843 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.2 (6th Cir. 2016).
194. Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018) (citing Univ. of Tex. v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)).
195. See E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 824 (4th Cir. 2008);
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land, 915 F.3d 197, 211 (4th Cir.
2019); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Constega Twp., 907 F.3d 725, 734–35 (3d
Cir. 2018).
196. N. Nat. Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1298 (D. Kan.
2010).
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010)).
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to enter their land, whereas a standard preliminary injunction does not
require the plaintiff to take affirmative action.199
Lastly, while some may argue that simply placing the property
rights in the hands of those who will inevitably obtain them does not
modify the right, this view overlooks the importance of timing in
property rights. The timing of property rights is a significant factor in
every property relationship.200 If the Supreme Court adopted the
Seventh Circuit approach, it would ensure that courts do not modify
the substantive rights of the pipeline companies before they come into
possession.
V. CONCLUSION
The Givens likely never expected to be embroiled in a fight
against a pipeline company about the right to use and the right to
exclude on their land. What they once believed to be a cautious,
conservative retirement investment turned into a nation-wide debate
centered on fundamental property rights. Sometime in the future,
Karolyn Givens will receive the money that Mountain Valley owes
her, but there is no definite timeline, and she will receive the money
well after the pipeline company has done the damage to her property.
The unmatched development of natural gas pipelines has come
at a cost too high for private landowners that are often left with no
other option of fighting back. While it is important to serve the
interests of the general public, especially in the context of energy, the
burden heavily infringes on private landowner’s property rights. There
is a circuit split because the Fourth Circuit recognizes the pipeline
company’s right to condemn upon completion of the FERC
certification, while the Seventh Circuit does not recognize it until after
a trial on just compensation. Courts should adopt the Seventh Circuit
approach because issuing a preliminary injunction is beyond the
powers of the judiciary in this context. These injunctions essentially
create a substantive right for the pipeline company when the company
is not yet entitled to it. Due to the high cost that the current method
imposes on private citizen’s property rights, the Supreme Court should
provide clarity moving forward. Additionally, the judiciary’s role in
this process should reflect what the NGA specifically intends. The
199. Id.
200. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Givens, 140 S. Ct. 300 (No. 19-54).
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Supreme Court should take up this issue to prevent any further
infringement on Congress’s power to administer the Takings Clause.

